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Abstract 
 
This paper introduces a strategy in the two envelopes problem that utilizes the prior 
beliefs of two players about the amount of money that their envelopes can contain. 
This strategy gives them more information about the decision of switching they have 
to make when one of the envelopes is opened and the amount it contains is revealed. 
The player who implements this strategy can predict which amount is larger with a 
probability greater than 1/2 so that he will have a greater expected return from the 
game than that of the other player who will not use the same strategy. The 
symmetrical case in which both players implement the same strategy is also analyzed. 
 
Introduction 
 
The strategy that is presented below is applied to the two envelopes problem played 
by two players with the following rules: Each player is given an envelope containing 
an amount of money. Both players are informed that one of the envelopes contains 
double the amount of the other envelope without knowing which envelope contains 
which amount. The envelope of a player is opened and the amount it contains is 
revealed. Then each player, secretly and independently from the other one, has to 
decide whether to ask or not for the exchange of his envelope with that of the other 
player. If both players request for an exchange then it will be made, otherwise they 
will keep their original envelopes. Finally, each player will win the amount of money 
inside the envelope that ended up to him. 
 
The Intermediate Amount Strategy (IAS) can be applied only in the variation of the 
game where one of the two amounts is revealed and only if the player who will 
implement it has a prior belief about the two amounts the game is played with. The 
cases where the players have no prior beliefs are well analyzed in the existing 
literature [1], [2], [3]. 
Let's see how this strategy works: First, the player thinks of an amount M. The 
optimal method of determining M will be discussed below, but the strategy works 
with any amount M. Then the amount contained in one envelope is revealed to the 
player. Assume that this amount is P. If P > M, the player will assume that P is the 
larger of the two amounts contained in the envelopes. If P ≤ M, the player will assume 
that P is the smaller of the two amounts. So according to his assumption, he will 
decide whether to keep or ask for the exchange of his envelope in order to end up with 
the larger amount. 
Applying this strategy leads to the following conclusions: In the case where M is 
smaller  than the smaller amount of the two envelopes then the probability of the 
player to ask for the envelope containing the larger amount is 1/2. In the case where 
M is larger than the larger amount of the two envelopes then the probability of the 
player to ask for the envelope containing the larger amount is also 1/2. However, in 
the case where M lies between the amounts of the two envelopes then the probability 
 of the player to ask for the larger amount is 1. It becomes clear that, however small is 
the probability of the amount M to be set between the amounts of the two envelopes, 
the IAS gives a probability of a correct prediction always greater than 1/2. 
Furthermore, the more realistically a player sets M, the greater his probability 
becomes to choose the larger amount. 
If both players implement equally successfully the IAS then the strategy’s advantage 
is neutralized, but each player does not know whether the other one will apply the IAS 
and how successfully he will apply it. As we will see, it turns out that it is profitable 
for each player to apply the IAS to maximize his expected amount, regardless of what 
the other player does. 
A general analysis of the strategy is described in the paper of Dov Samet, Iddo Samet 
and David Schmeidler [4]. 
Let’s see how we can formalize and quantify the profit obtained using the IAS. We 
will examine two ways that a player can implement the IAS, according to the 
estimations he can make about the two amounts. 
 
1. 1st Type of calculation – Uniform Distribution 
 
In the 1st type of calculation, the player considers the distribution of the probability of 
the two amounts lying within a particular interval to be uniform. More specifically, 
the player will choose this type of calculation if both of the following conditions are 
true: 
A) He has a prior belief for the maximum amount of money that the organizer of the 
game could pay to a player. So he sets in a variable N the maximum amount that 
according to his estimation an envelope can contain. 
B) He cannot estimate where the two amounts are placed within the interval (0, N] 
that he set. 
 
Definitions 
 
At first we will specify the rules by which the game is played. We consider that the 
game organizer has decided beforehand the two amounts that he will place in the 
envelopes. He places the smaller amount in one envelope and the larger amount in the 
other one and with a random process he selects which envelope to give to each player.  
We will refer to the unknown amounts of the two envelopes with the continuous 
variables X and 2X that will correspond to the smaller and the larger amount 
respectively. The domains of the variables X and 2X according to the player who set N 
are the following: 
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The reason for defining the maximum X as half of N is that if the player believed that 
X could be even larger, then the resulting 2X would have been greater than N, so he 
would have to adjust the value of N.  
In the 1st type of calculation the player considers the probability densities of the 
variables X and 2X to be constant, i.e. it is equally likely for X and 2X to lie anywhere 
within their domains and that they cannot be found elsewhere. We define the constant 
probability density function f (s) to be the inverse of the product of the total range of 
N and the percentage s of this range that we will refer to. Formally: 
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By this definition, the probabilities that the two variables X and 2X have to lie within 
their domains are respectively: 
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The mean amounts of the two envelopes are respectively: 
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The formulas (1.3) and (1.4) come from the definition of the Uniform Distribution.  
Now, for the definition of the intermediate amount M, we saw in the Introduction that 
the player has an interest to choose M to the point that maximizes the probability to lie 
between the amounts of X and 2X. We can also say that a given M lies between X and 
2X when X takes a value between M/2 and M. So the probability of M to lie between 
the two amounts is maximized when the range between M/2 and M is also maximized 
and this happens when the player sets M to the maximum value that X can get, namely 
when: 
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In this case, M will lie between the two amounts when X lies between N/4 and N/2 and 
the probability of this to happen is given by the quotient of the favorable range over 
the total range that X can be found at. Formally: 
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So, the player who will apply the 1st type of calculation should always set the value 
N/2 to M to consider that there is a probability of 1/2 for M to lie between the amounts 
of the two envelopes. 
We will denote by A the amount that both players see in the envelope of player A. We 
will denote by ΜA the intermediate amount M that is set by player A. 
 
Calculations 
 
The calculations of the players must be made at the time where one of the envelopes 
is opened in order to have the maximum possible information about the game. 
We initially consider that each player doesn’t know what strategy the other player is 
about to implement. 
Before the envelope is opened, the expected amount contained in player A’s envelope 
is given by assigning a probability of 1/2 to the events of holding the smaller or the 
larger amount, namely: 
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The following calculations concern player A when his envelope is opened. 
We distinguish two cases depending on the relationship between the amount A that is 
revealed and the amount ΜA he set: 
 
1. If Α ≤ ΜA then according to the IAS player A will consider that the amount of A 
contained in his envelope is the smaller of the two amounts and therefore he will 
request to exchange his envelope. 
 
We now distinguish two subcases depending on whether A is actually the smaller 
or the larger amount:  
 
1a.  If A = X then provided that the exchange request will be accepted, player A 
will end up with the amount 2X. 
1b.  If A = 2X then provided that the exchange request will be accepted, player 
A will end up with the amount X. 
 
According to the formulas (1.1) and (1.5) player A considers that the subcase 1a is 
twice more likely to occur than the subcase 1b. This is because P(2X ≤ N/2) = P(X ≤ 
N/4) = ½ P(X ≤ N/2) due to the uniform distribution. Since subcases 1a and 1b are 
complementary, player A has to assign them the probabilities of 2/3 and 1/3 
respectively.  
So the expected amount given to player A in case 1, provided that his exchange 
request will be accepted, is: 
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If player A’s exchange request is not accepted then his expected amount is calculated 
by alternating X with 2X in formula (1.8), i.e.: 
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2. If Α > ΜA then according to the IAS player A will consider that the amount of A 
contained in his envelope is the larger of the two amounts and therefore will ask to 
keep his envelope. 
 
In case 2, player A considers the event that his envelope containing the amount X to 
be impossible, according to formulas (1.1) and (1.5). 
So he considers certain that the expected amount in his envelope is: 
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 We should note that in case 2 the expected amount of player A is not depended on 
player B’s decision to exchange or not his envelope because player A decides to keep 
his envelope and that cannot be changed. 
 
We will now calculate the expected amount given by the IAS for player A before his 
envelope is opened, i.e. by co-calculating cases 1 and 2: 
The probability of 2X to be laid in the interval (0, Ν/2] is the same with the probability 
to be laid in the interval (Ν/2, Ν] due to the uniform distribution. 
We showed above that the probability of X to be laid in the interval (0, Ν/2] is double 
the probability of 2X to be laid in the same interval. Hence, the probability of case 1 
to occur is 3 times larger than the probability of case 2 to occur and since these two 
events are complimentary, the corresponding probability values are 3/4 and 1/4 
respectively. 
 
We will denote by pB the probability that player A assigns to the event that player B 
will ask to exchange his envelope. Then the expected amount that player A calculates 
it will end up to him, before his envelope is opened, is given by the formula: 
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Even if player A is certain that player B will not ask for an exchange (pB = 0), the 
result of the formula (1.11) becomes the same as that of the formula (1.7), which is 
his expected amount without the use of IAS. The larger player A considers pB to be, 
the larger his expected amount becomes. In the ideal case where player B knows 
nothing about IAS, he might always agree for the exchange of envelopes because he 
would believe that it doesn’t make a difference anyway. If player A knows this in 
advance, he can set pB = 1 in formula (1.11) and the result will be the maximum 
possible expected amount that is equal to 7Χ / 4. If player A has no information about 
player B’s intention to exchange or not his envelope then he will not be able to set a 
value to probability pB, but even in this case, formula (1.11) shows that it is in player 
A’s best interest to implement the IAS. 
 
Of course, player A may be wrong about his estimations. For example it may be the 
case that the actual amount X is larger than the amount ΜA he set. In this and every 
case that ΜA is not set between the amounts Χ and 2Χ, player A will not have a benefit 
by implementing the IAS and his expected amount will be 3Χ / 2 according to formula 
(1.7). Nevertheless, player A considers that there is a probability of 1/2 for ΜA to 
actually be set between Χ and 2Χ according to the formula (1.6) and then he will end 
up with the amount 2X if he will ask to keep his envelope or if his exchange request 
will be accepted. So, he can also calculate his expected amount by the formula: 
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which again gives the maximum expected amount for player A, given that if he asks 
for an exchange, his request will be accepted. 
 
 Suppose now that player B is also implementing the IAS with the 1st type of 
calculation and he considers his own uniform distribution. Therefore, he will set his 
own maximum amount that an envelope can contain, let’s name it ΝΒ, and he will set 
his own intermediate amount ΜΒ = ΝΒ / 2. The formulas (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10) remain 
the same for player B and they give him the expected amounts of player A with 
respect to ΜΒ. 
If player B wants to calculate his expected amount before player A’s envelope is 
opened, he will accordingly set a probability pΑ that player A will ask for an exchange 
and his expected amount will be: 
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Note that the results of the formulas (1.11) and (1.13) differ only to the probability of 
the other player to ask for an exchange, as it was expected due to the symmetry of the 
two cases. 
 
We will now examine the expected amounts when both players implement the IAS, 
but with different intermediate amount M each. We will rely on the results of the 
formulas (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10) and we will examine every possible interrelation 
between the amounts A, ΜΑ and ΜΒ and every possible outcome of the exchange 
request. The results are shown in the following table: 
 
 
 
 Table 1 
 
In the cases a, b, c, d of Table 1, an exchange is not agreed because when one player 
is requesting for an exchange according to the IAS the other player also according to 
the IAS chooses to keep his envelope. We also note that the total expected amount of 
the players in these cases is 3X, because the amounts they are going to share are the X 
and the 2X. 
In the case e, none of the players according to IAS will ask for an exchange because 
they both consider it more likely to have the amount of 2X in their envelope. This 
disagreement is due to the fact that each M is positioned to a different side in relation 
to the amount A. 
 In the case f, both players according to the IAS will ask for an exchange and it will be 
granted, because they both consider it more likely to have the amount of X in their 
envelope. This disagreement is also due to the fact that each M is positioned to a 
different side in relation to A, but reversed from the case e. 
In the cases e and f, the total expected amount of the players results greater than 3X 
and this is because only the player who has set M at the correct side of A is right. 
 
Now, let’s calculate the expected amount of each player, before the amount A is 
revealed, when they both know beforehand that the other player will also implement 
the IAS. We will use the results of Table 1 excluding the cases e and f, because in 
these cases one of the two players has made a wrong assessment. We have already 
mentioned that the cases a and b have a probability to occur equal to 1/4 and the cases 
c and d have a probability to occur equal to 3/4. Thus, the expected amounts derived 
from Table 1 are: 
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The results of the formulas (1.14) and (1.15) are the same, due to the symmetry of the 
cases. It is obvious that when both players know in advance that the other player will 
also implement the IAS they can expect no profit from the strategy, unless they are in 
the cases e and f. Of course they will also have to implement the IAS because 
otherwise they will give the advantage to the other player who will. 
 
2. 2nd Type of calculation – Normal Distribution 
 
In the 2nd type of calculation, the player considers that the probability of the two 
amounts to deviate from the values he set is following a normal distribution. More 
specifically, the player will choose this type of calculation if both of the following 
conditions are true: 
A) He doesn’t want to estimate the maximum amount of money that the organizer of 
the game could pay to a player. 
B) He has a prior belief of how large the two amounts can be. 
 
Definitions 
 
In the 2nd type of calculation the variable N is not defined. 
Player A will denote by XΑ what he considers to be the most likely smaller amount 
and thus he will denote by 2XΑ what he considers to be the most likely larger amount. 
These two definitions will be made before the opening of an envelope. 
Player A will also set the amount ΜA in the middle between XΑ and 2ΧΑ, i.e.: 
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 The amount ΜA is considered by player A to have the greatest probability to lie 
between the actual amounts of the two envelopes, which are the Χ and the 2Χ, 
similarly to the way is set in formula (1.5) of the 1st type of calculation. 
Here, the probability density function f of XΑ to be any amount is not constant as of 
the 1st type of calculation, but it has a peak to the point that the player considers as the 
most likely smaller amount and decreases as we deviate from it. Under this 
consideration, the most proper way to define f is the truncated normal distribution 
function. So let’s define its parameters. 
We define the standard deviation σ as a function of a point μ where f  has its peak, i.e.: 
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The reason we set the standard deviation as a function depended by the variable μ is to 
assure that the certainty of the player that has set correctly an amount is depended by 
the value of that amount. In other words, it is not equally likely for a player to deviate 
by 100 euros when he predicts that the smaller amount is 0.01 euros and when he 
predicts that it is 1000 euros. The deviation in the first case should be smaller and in 
the second case should be larger. 
cv is the coefficient of variation and it remains constant. Its value will be determined 
below. 
Each time we are referring to the probability densities of XΑ and 2ΧΑ, we will set μ = 
XΑ and μ = 2ΧΑ accordingly. 
We are now ready to define the probability density function, following the theory of 
the truncated normal distribution [5], [6], when the lower bound of the independent 
variable is zero and the upper bound is infinity: 
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The functions φ(t) and Φ(x) are respectively the density and the cumulative 
distribution of the standard normal distribution N(0,1). The f(x, μ) is the probability 
density function that we will use in our calculations. Its arguments are the variable x 
that corresponds to the amount for which the probability is calculated and the constant 
μ that corresponds to the point that the function has its peak. We set the additional 
argument of μ to the function f so that we can use the same function for both the 
amounts XΑ and 2ΧΑ. 
To calculate the coefficient of variation cv that we left undefined above, we note that 
exactly at the middle between the amounts XΑ and 2ΧΑ, the probability densities of the 
two amounts must be equal. Formally: 
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This equation should be true because for example if the player considers that the most 
likely smaller amount is 100 euros, so the most likely larger amount is 200 euros, then 
given that the envelope is opened contains 150 euros, he will have to assign equal 
probabilities to the events that the 150 euros is the smaller or the larger amount. 
Solving the equation (2.6) by the variable cv we get: 
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The domains of XΑ and 2ΧΑ are: 
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The probabilities of the two amounts to lie within their domains are respectively: 
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The value of f(2XΑ, 2XΑ) is half the value of f(XΑ, XΑ) and in general the graph of 
f(x,2XΑ) is shorter and wider than that of f(x, XΑ). This is due to the fact that when the 
player is off by say 10% in the value of XΑ over the actual X then he is necessarily off 
by 10% in the value of 2XΑ over the actual 2X. The same must be true with the 
corresponding probabilities of XΑ and 2XΑ to lie within two specific intervals that are 
set relatively to these values. Formally, the function f  has been defined so that the 
following equation is always true for any percentage k: 
 
( ) ( )∫ ∫
⋅+
⋅−
⋅+
⋅−
=
AA
AA
AA
AA
XkX
XkX
XkX
XkX
AA dxXxfdxXxf
22
22
2,,
 (2.10) 
 
The above equation is ensured by the definition of the standard deviation as a function 
of point μ in the formula (2.2) and it is independent to cv. 
 
Again, we will denote by A the amount that is revealed in the envelope of player A. 
In Graph 1 is presented an example of plotting the functions f(x, XΑ) and f(x, 2XΑ) for 
XΑ = 300, 2XΑ = 600, ΜΑ = 450 and a revealed amount A = 550. 
 
  
     Graph 1 
 
 
Calculations 
 
The following calculations are concerning player A when his envelope is opened. 
When player A’s envelope is opened he will implement the IAS. Even though it is 
equally likely for player A to hold the smaller or the larger amount, when his amount 
is revealed he can utilize his prior belief for the values of the two amounts, so that he 
can attribute a different probability to the events that the amount he sees is the smaller 
or the larger one. 
First, player A will calculate the density functions f(A, ΧΑ) and f(A, 2ΧΑ) and then he 
will calculate the final probabilities of the amount A he sees to be the smaller or the 
larger one, in the following way: 
 
)2,(),(
),(][
AA
A
XAfXAf
XAf
XAP
+
==  (2.11) 
 
)2,(),(
)2,(]2[
AA
A
XAfXAf
XAf
XAP
+
==  (2.12) 
 
so that: 
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We now distinguish two cases depending on the relationship between the amount A 
that is revealed and the amount ΜA that he set: 
 
1. If A ≤ ΜA then according to the IAS player A will ask for the exchange of his 
envelope. The expected amount that will end up to him, provided that his 
exchange request will be accepted, is: 
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 If his exchange request will not be accepted then his expected amount is calculated by 
switching Χ with 2Χ in formula (2.14): 
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2. If A > ΜA then according to the IAS player A will ask to keep his envelope, so the 
expected amount that will end up to him is: 
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By the way we defined the probability density function, or simply by observing Graph 
1, it follows that: 
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By the formulas (2.14), (2.16), (2.17) and (2.18) it follows that for every initial 
amount A, player A considers that the probability he has to end up with the amount 2X 
is always greater than the probability to end up with the amount X. So the 
implementation of the IAS is also advantageous for the player in the 2nd type of 
calculation. 
 
If player B wants to implement the IAS, he will have to set as XΒ the amount that he 
considers as the most likely to be the smaller amount and as 2ΧΒ the amount that he 
considers as the most likely to be the larger one. He will also have to set his own 
amount ΜΒ as the middle between XΒ and 2ΧΒ and his own function f for the 
probability densities of the two amounts. 
 
In a similar way as that we showed in the 1st type of calculation, the two players can 
calculate their expected amounts before the opening of the envelope and when they 
both know that the other player will implement the IAS also. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We analyzed two types of implementing the Intermediate Amount Strategy (IAS) that 
utilize the prior beliefs of two players about the amounts that their envelopes can 
contain. These methods suggested whether or not the players should ask for the 
exchange of their envelopes. The decision of the players for which type of calculation 
should implement must not depend on which type gives them the larger expected 
amount, but on which of the two distributions’ parameters think they can define with 
greater accuracy. The more accurate are defined the parameters of each type of 
calculation the larger the expected amount will be, but the opposite is not true. We 
saw that in both the 1st and the 2nd type of calculation the player has an interest to 
implement the IAS because he raises his chances to end up with the larger amount, 
even with the least accurate definition of its parameters as opposed to the indifferent 
way of choosing an envelope. The Intermediate Amount Strategy gives a new interest 
to the old two envelopes problem and shows how many things can still be written 
about it. 
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